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Casenote

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.:
A Simple Interpretation of Text and
Precedent Results in Simplified Claims
Under the ADEA
In Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc.,' the United States Supreme
Court was asked to clarify whether the direct evidence requirement
articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins2 -later superseded by the
Civil Rights Act of 19913-applied to mixed-motive claims brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).4 In
an unexpected twist, the Court held that a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of any evidence, direct or indirect, that age was the "butfor" or "determinative" cause of the adverse employment action.'
Accordingly, the employer bears no burden of persuasion on any issue in
defending claims under the ADEA If the plaintiff carries that heavy

1. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
2. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), supersededby statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see infra text accompanying notes 52-60.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346.
5. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350, 2352.
6. Id. at 2352.
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burden, there is liability; the defendant no longer has (or needs) the
"same decision" defense that previously avoided ADEA liability once the
plaintiff had shown that age played some part in the challenged
employment decision. 7 Because the Court's decision in Gross requires
ADEA plaintiffs to show that age played a decisive causative role, the
ADEA defendant has no defense to carry and hence no burden of
persuasion.' Although it simplifies the analysis for ADEA mixed-motive
claims, the decision, should it survive nascent congressional stirrings of
opposition, will make it harder for plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment motions or motions for judgment as a matter of law. Courts
will now also be forced to consider whether Gross has an impact on the
trial of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 198110 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1971 Jack Gross began working for FBL Financial Group, Inc. In
2003, when he was fifty-four years old, Gross was reassigned to a new
position. Many of his former job responsibilities were assigned to a
newly created position filled by Lisa Kneeskern, a woman in her early
forties who had previously worked under Gross. Although Gross
continued to receive the same compensation, he viewed the reassignment
as a demotion."

7. See id. at 2351.
8. See id. at 2351-52.
9. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), the Supreme Court
established the basic rule for lower courts when considering motions for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see Anderson, 477
U.S. at 256-57. A moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.
R. Civ. P. 56(cX2). Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer
some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides that a court
should render judgment as a matter of law when "a party has been fully heard on an issue
during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P.
50(a). The Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000), interpreted Rule 50(a) to mean that when "entertaining a motion for judgment as
a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record," not just the
evidence favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 150. The standard for granting
judgment as a matter of law mirrors the standard for granting summary judgment. Id.
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
12. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346-47 (2009).
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Gross filed suit against FBL in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa, arguing that his reassignment constituted
an adverse employment action in violation of the ADEA." At the
conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to find in favor of
Gross if he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he was
demoted, and (2) age was a motivating factor in FBL's decision.
According to the court, age was a motivating factor if it played a part in
the demotion. Finally, the jury instructions dictated that the jury must
find in favor of FBL if the defense proved that it would have made the
same decision regardless of Gross's age. The jury returned a verdict for
Gross. 4
"The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed
and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury had been incorrectly
instructed under the standard established in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins."" According to the court of appeals, Gross failed to provide
direct evidence of discrimination; therefore, he was ineligible for a
mixed-motive jury instruction that would place the burden on FBL to
prove that it would have reassigned Gross for lawful reasons alone. 6
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court on
certiorari was "whether a plaintiff must 'present direct evidence of
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a nonTitle VII discrimination case.'"'17 Before reaching that question,
however, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the burden of persuasion
never shifts to the party defending an alleged mixed-motive discrimination claim under the ADEA.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress passed the ADEA"9 to prohibit employers from arbitrarily
discriminating against employees based on age.20 To accomplish this
goal, the ADEA provides that it is "unlawful for an employer... to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate

13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2347.
14. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2347.
15. Id.; 490 U.S. 228 (1989), supersededby statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B)
(2006)); see infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
16. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2347.
17. Id. at 2348 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No.
08-441)).
18. Id.
19. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2006)).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
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against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age."2' The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment in a
manner similar to how Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196422
prohibits discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' Although not exactly the same, the language and structure of
the ADEA, most notably its "because of' language, often mirrors that of
Title VII.' Consequently, when addressing claims of age discrimination, courts have frequently used the same analysis that is used to
decide Title VII claims of discrimination based upon race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.'
The most common framework used for Title VII claims was set out by
the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.2" In McDonnell the Court held that a Title VII plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination through indirect,
circumstantial evidence by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his

rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualificationsY
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection. " ' Should the employer carry this burden,
the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not
the true reasons, but rather a mere pretext for discriminatory reamade
sons. 29 Ultimately, the plaintiff must prove that the employer
30
the decision because of the plaintiff's membership in a group.
Eight years after the decision in McDonnell, the Court in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine3 ' clarified the framework

21. Id. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
22.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).

23. See id. § 2000e-2(a).
24. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000).
25.

See, e.g., id.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Id. at 802.
Id.
Id. at 804.
See id. at 800-02.
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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by emphasizing that the defendant's burden is simply one of production,
not proof.3" In Burdine the Court stated that the plaintiff always
retains "t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."3 The
Court also reiterated that the McDonnell framework was flexible and,
because of the wide variety of factual scenarios that could present
themselves under Title VII, may not apply in every situation.3 '
Although the McDonnell framework was created in a Title VII case, its
simplicity has led courts to apply its process of evidentiary analysis to
age discrimination claims." Since the passage of the ADEA every
circuit has employed some variant of the framework to analyze ADEA
claims that are based primarily on circumstantial evidence.'
Because direct evidence of discrimination is usually "hard to come by"
in employment discrimination cases,37 the McDonnell framework serves
the important function of using circumstantial evidence to "eliminate[]
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the [employee's]
Once these nondiscriminatory reasons are eliminated, an
rejection.'
inference of discrimination is raised because the court presumes that
"'these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors.'" 39 However, the situation
becomes complicated when the fact finder determines that the challenged employment decision was based on impermissible, discriminatory
factors as well as permissible, nondiscriminatory factors. 40 The Court

32. Id. at 254-55.
33. Id. at 253.
34. Id. at 253 n.6.
35. See, e.g., Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 429 (4th Cir.
2000); Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2000); Hall v. Giant
Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d
986, 990-91 (8th Cir. 1998); Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir.
1998); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998); Keller
v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997); Kaniff v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
121 F.3d 258, 263 (7th Cir. 1997); Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 456-57 (9th
Cir. 1995); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993); Mesnick v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp.,
670 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1982).
36. See supra note 35.
37. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring),
superseded by statute,Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B)).
38. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
39. Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
40. The circuits took a variety of approaches prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse. The First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits held that once the
plaintiff has shown that an impermissible factor played a substantial or motivating part
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first addressed such a situation in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.41 In
a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that once
a Title VII plaintiff proves that an impermissible factor played a
motivating part in the defendant's employment decision, the defendant
may avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same decision in the absence of the impermissible factor.4 2 Unlike the concurring and dissenting opinions, Justice
Brennan reasoned that the language of Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination "because of' the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin,4 did not require a plaintiff to show that an impermissible factor was the "but-for" cause of an employment decision."
Furthermore, Justice Brennan did not specify the quantum of evidence
required to shift the burden of proof in mixed-motive cases.'
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion that some courts later
followed as the authoritative view of the Court because it was the
narrowest opinion necessary to form a majority.4 6 Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the plurality in two notable areas. First, Justice
O'Connor asserted that the legislative history of Title VII and the plain
meaning of the words "because of' indicated that an employer only

in an employment decision, the employer could avoid liability by proving that it would have
made the same employment decision even in the absence of the impermissible criteria.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n.2. These circuits either used the preponderance
standard or did not mention the proper standard. Id. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia applied the same rule as the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits; however, the D.C. Circuit required the higher "clear and convincing" standard of
proof. Id The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits imposed the biggest challenge
on plaintiffs, requiring them to prove that race, gender, or another impermissible factor
was the "but-for" cause of termination. Id. The Ninth Circuit stood alone in only requiring
the plaintiff in a Title VII case to show by clear and convincing evidence that an
impermissible factor played a part in the employment decision. Id At this point, the
employer could have avoided reinstating the employee and awarding him backpay by
proving that it would have made the same decision even without considering the
impermissible factor. Id. The Eighth Circuit was similar to the Ninth Circuit in that it
differentiated the liability and remedial aspects of Title VII litigation, but applied the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Id.
41. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B)).
42. Id. at 244-45, 253.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41 ("Moreover, since we know that the words
'because of do not mean 'solely because of,' we also know that Title VII meant to condemn
even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations."
(Footnote omitted)).
45. See id. at 251-52.
46. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
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violated Title VII when an impermissible factor was the "but-for" cause
of an adverse employment action.4 7 Although Justice O'Connor did not
explain how an employer could prove that it would have made the "same
decision" for lawful reasons alone if the plaintiff had already proved that
an impermissible factor was the "but-for" cause of the challenged
decision, Justice O'Connor contended that the employer should bear that
burden (on the same-decision defense) only when the plaintiff proves
that "an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision."' Second, Justice O'Connor took issue with the plurality's broad
statements regarding the relative roles played by lawful and unlawful
motives in determining what type of prima facie evidence suffices to
impose that same-decision burden of persuasion on the employer.49
Justic O'Connor stressed that the employer would bear that burden on
the issue of causation only when "a disparate treatment plaintiff [could]
show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial
factor in the decision." 0
Combining these requirements, Justice
O'Connor concluded that a plaintiff cannot impose a persuasion burden
on the employer respecting the same-decision defense unless the plaintiff
has proven "by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a
substantial factor in the decision."8 '

47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I disagree with
the plurality's dictum that the words 'because of' do not mean 'but-for' causation;
manifestly they do."). The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Kennedy and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, agreed with Justice O'Connor that a plaintiff
must show that an impermissible criterion was the "but-for" cause of an adverse
employment action. Id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that the
plurality opinion would cause confusion because, while it adopted a standard unrelated to
but-for causation initially, it adopted a but-for standard once the burden has been placed
upon the employer. Id. at 283. Unlike Justice O'Connor, the dissent would not allow any
deviation from the framework established in McDonnell or Burdine. Id. at 290.
48. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 276-77.
50. Id. at 276 (emphasis added). Some scholars have criticized Justice O'Connor's
direct-evidence requirement and the ambiguities it created. See, e.g., Steven M. Tindall,
Do As She Does, Not As She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O'Connor'sDirect Evidence
Requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332, 336
(1996) (arguing that Justice O'Connor failed to articulate clearly "what she meant by direct
evidence," resulting in differing interpretations and applications of this standard by the
lower courts).
51. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
further states:
[Tihe entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate
for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.
That the employer's burden in rebutting such an inferential case of discrimination
is only one of production does not mean that the scales should be weighted in the
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Two years after the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991,52 which was partly in response to the Court's
recent interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866' and of Title
VII.' The 1991 Act-amending Title VII but not the ADEA-addressed the Court's decision in Price Waterhouse by "setting forth standards
applicable in 'mixed-motive' cases."5 5 The 1991 Act codified part of the
plurality's holding by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)," which allows a
plaintiff to prove an unlawful employment practice by simply demonstrating that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivatingfactor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice."57 Notably, the 1991 Act did not specify
that any particular type of evidence, direct or indirect, was required to
Moreover,
establish liability under the new statutory provision."
§ 706(g) of Title V1I 9 was amended by adding paragraph (2)(B), which
dilutes a defendant's "same-decision" showing under Title VII from a
complete affirmative defense to a device that merely relieves the
employer who carries it from certain remedies, hiring or promotion
and
requirements, or reinstatement orders, and from the compensatory
°
punitive damages newly authorized by the 1991 Act.
After the Price Waterhouse decision and the passage of the 1991 Act,
the United States Courts of Appeal were divided on whether direct
evidence was required in Title VII mixed-motive cases.6 ' In Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 2 a unanimous Supreme Court resolved the issue
by holding that in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need present only sufficient evidence

same manner where there is direct evidence of intentional discrimination. Indeed,
in one Age Discrimination in Employment Act case, the Court seemed to indicate
that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents
direct evidence of discrimination."
Id. at 271 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
52. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1992 (2006).
54. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994).
55. Id. at 251.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
60. See id. § 2000e-5(gX2)(B).
61. Desert Palace,539 U.S. at 95. After Price Waterhouse, a number of circuits relied
primarily on Justice O'Connor's concurrence and maintained that direct evidence was
necessary to establish liability under § 2000e-2(m). Id.
62. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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for a jury to conclude by a preponderance of either direct or indirect
evidence that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.' 3 The Court relied
primarily on the statutory text, which did "not mention, much less
require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct
evidence."' Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, also pointed to the
"[conventional rul[e] of civil litigation" that is usually applied in Title
VII cases, which requires a plaintiff to prove his case only by a
preponderance of whatever evidence he could use--direct or indirect."
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, as subsequently interpreted, stipulated
that the "motivating factor" standard of causation is adequate for
liability in Title VII disparate treatment cases." Less clear after the
1991 Act was the standard of causation in ADEA disparate treatment
cases. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,"7 the Court explained that in
cases arising under the ADEA, liability depended on whether age
"actually motivated the employer's decision.'
At first glance this
language seems similar to that of the plurality in Price Waterhouse and
the language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. However, later in the
opinion, the Court stated that a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment
cannot succeed unless the plaintiff's protected trait was a factor in the
employer's decision "and had a determinative influence on the outcome." 9 The Court repeated this language in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.70 In that case, the Court specified that the
plaintiff can use the McDonnell framework to rebut an employer's
evidence that its employment decision was based on a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.7 The Court also emphasized that although
the intermediate evidentiary burden during trial could shift between the
plaintiff and the employer (on different issues), "[tihe ultimate burden

63. Id. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
64. Id. at 98-99.
65. Id. at 99 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 253).
66. See id. at 101.
67. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
68. Id. at 610. The Court noted that although it was clear from the statutory language
that the disparate treatment theory was available under the ADEA, the Court had never
decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability was available. Id. Because the
parties in Hazen did not articulate a disparate impact theory, the Court did not address
it. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000).
71. Id. at 142. The Court assumed that the McDonnell framework applied without
squarely addressing the issue. See id.
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of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discrimi72
nated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."
Accordingly, while the Court's decision in Desert Palace clarified
mixed-motive cases under Title VII, it left unanswered whether a mixedmotive analysis under the ADEA survived the 1991 Act amendments to
Title VII, and if so, whether a plaintiff had to offer direct evidence of age
discrimination to place a same-decision burden on a defendant. Every
circuit that addressed the issue held that mixed-motive analysis
continued to apply in ADEA cases;73 the circuits were split, however,
as to whether direct evidence was needed for the plaintiff to obtain a
mixed-motive jury instruction that would impose a same-decision burden
of persuasion on the employer.74 The Court granted certiorari in Gross
v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc.7" to resolve the latter issue,76 but the
Court reached a broader conclusion than its grant of certiorari foretold.
III. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 7' the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that ADEA75 plaintiffs must prove
that age was the but-for or determinative factor in employment
decisions, and consequently, mixed-motive jury instructions are never
proper in cases arising under that statute.79

72. Id. at 143 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
73. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2354-55 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
74. The Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits required direct evidence in mixed-motive
cases. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated,
129 S. Ct. 2343; Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005); Anderson v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit at least tacitly
approved of the direct evidence requirement. See, e.g., EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co.,
364 F.3d 160, 164 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004). In contrast, the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits analyzed mixed-motive ADEA cases using the same analysis that the
Supreme Court used in Desert Palace, allowing a plaintiff to present direct or indirect
evidence to establish a mixed-motive claim and shift the burden. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack
In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004); Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N.
Am., 345 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2003), affd on reh'g, 377 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2004); Costa v.
Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 539 U.S. 90;
Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 1999); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1999).
75. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
76. See id. at 2348.
77. 129 S.Ct. 2343 (2009).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
79. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, which was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito. Id. at 2346. Both
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A.

The Majority
The Court agreed to review whether the direct evidence requirement
articulated by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'
applied to mixed-motive cases under the ADEA. s
Rather than
answering this question at the outset of the opinion, Justice Thomas
first addressed the "threshold inquiry" of whether the employer ever
bears the burden of persuasion under the ADEA when the trial reveals
that an employer may have based its employment decision on both
lawful and unlawful motives.8 2 Justice Thomas rejected the petitioner's
argument that the Court should invariably rely on past decisions
construing similar language of Title VII' when interpreting the
ADEA's substantive liability provisions governing disparate treatment.84 Justice Thomas observed that unlike Title VII after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,' the ADEA's text does not allow a plaintiff to prove
unlawful discrimination simply by showing that age was a "motivating"
factor in an adverse employment action." Significantly, when Congress
amended Title VII, Congress similarly did not relax the plaintiff's
required prima facie proof under the ADEA or even mention a "samedecision" defense in the ADEA, even as the Title VII amendments
diluted the significance of a same-decision showing from an affirmative
defense to a mere amelioration of remedy.8 7 The 1991 Act therefore
suggests Congress's intent not to overturn pre-1991 Act interpretations
of the ADEA, especially because other provisions of the ADEA were
amended as part of the 1991 Act.88 To base the Court's interpretation
of the liability provisions of the ADEA on pre-1991 Act decisions like
Price Waterhouse or the post-1991 Act decision in Desert Palace,Inc. v.

Justice Stevens and Justice Souter wrote dissenting opinions. Id. at 2352.
80. 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006)).
81. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
82. Id. at 2348 & n.1.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
84. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
85. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
86. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
87. Id.
88. Id. ("When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is
presumed to have acted intentionally.").
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Costa9 would ignore the apparent congressional intent to treat ADEA
claims differently.90
Justice Thomas then focused on the language of the ADEA, mainly
section 29 U.S.C. § 623(aXl), 9 1 which prohibits employers from discriminating against a plaintiff "because of such individual's age."9 According to Justice Thomas, the ordinary meaning of§ 623(a)(1) indicates that
a plaintiff must prove that his age was the "reason" why the employer
took an adverse employment action.' The term reason signifies but-for
causation, meaning that the ADEA plaintiff retains the burden to
establish that age was the but-for cause of the adverse employment
action." Justice Thomas noted that this interpretation is consistent
with language in the Court's previous ADEA decisions that require a
plaintiff to prove not only that age was a factor in the employer's
decision
but also that it had a "determinative influence on the out95
come."
Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the argument made by the plaintiff
and the dissent that ADEA interpretation should be controlled by the
Court's analysis in Price Waterhouse.' While he conceded that the
Court had applied pre-1991 interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA in
Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi" with respect to disparate impact
claims, Justice Thomas distinguished the current statutory picture of
ADEA disparate treatment claims. 98 For disparate treatment claims,
the 1991 Act eased the Title VII plaintiff's job of establishing a prima
facie case by providing for liability upon a showing that race, sex, color,
national origin, or religion simply motivated the challenged decision. 99
The 1991 Act also partially superseded Price Waterhouse by denying
employers in Title VII cases the complete affirmative defense that that
decision afforded them if they carried the same-decision showing,
substituting instead the mere remedy alleviation in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

89. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
90. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349. Justice Thomas stressed the danger of applying rules
mandated under one statute to a different statute without a careful analysis to determine
whether Congress intended such an application. Id, (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 623(aXl).
92. Id. (emphasis added); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350.
93. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2350-51 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
96. Id. at 2351.
97. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
98. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 & n.5.
99. Id.
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5(g)(2)(B) 1 ° Justice Thomas reasoned that these statutory changes
suggested two things: First, that proof that an impermissible criterion
was simply a motivating factor was not sufficient under Title VII prior
to the 1991 Act. 1 1 Second, because Congress could have specified
motivating-factor liability under the ADEA in the 1991 Act but failed to
do so, Congress did not intend pre-1991 interpretations of Title VII to
apply to the ADEA. 1 Justice Thomas noted that regardless of any
flaws in the Price Waterhouse reasoning, its burden-shifting framework
had become difficult to apply."° Thus, even if it were "doctrinally
sound," the difficulties in applying Price Waterhouse in the courtroom
against extending that burden-shifting framework to ADEA
counseled
10 4
claims.
Almost as an afterthought, in a footnote, Justice Thomas finally
addressed part of the question addressed by the Court's grant of a writ
of certiorari.1 "5 Justice Thomas explained that although a plaintiff will
always have the burden of persuasion on the only ultimate issue in an
ADEA disparate treatment claim-whether age was the determinative
factor in the employer's challenged decision-a plaintiff may meet this
burden by any evidence, direct or indirect.' Justice Thomas reasoned
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX2)(B); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.5.
101. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.5 (reasoning that "[i]f such 'motivating factor' claims
were already part of Title VII, the addition of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) alone would have been
sufficient").
102. Id. The main difference between Justice Thomas's opinion and the dissent on
whether pre-1991 interpretations of Title VII should apply to ADEA cases seems to hinge
on the impact congressional ratification or abrogation has on a court's previous
interpretation of statutory text. To Justice Thomas, the fact that Congress failed to amend
the ADEA in the manner that it amended Title VII was controlling. See id. In contrast,
the dissent argued that congressional amendment of Title VII in fact endorses the Court's
pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII (and thus of the ADEA). See id. at 2356 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
103. Id. at 2352 (majority opinion) (casting doubt on whether the Court would have
taken the same approach that the Court in Price Waterhouse took if it had the chance to
consider the question for the first time).
104. Id. at 2351-52. It would appear that the analysis used by Justice Kennedy and
Justice Scalia when interpreting the pre-1991 Title VII (and thus the pre-1991 ADEA)
finally won out. Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia are the only remaining members of
the Court who dissented in PriceWaterhouse. Much of the reasoning they used in that case
regarding pre-1991 Title VII is present in Gross. The problems with applying the burdenshifting analysis were predicted by Justice Kennedy in Price Waterhouse. See Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 291-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Clourts will... be saddled
with the task of developing standards for determining when to apply the burden shift.").
In fact, Justice Kennedy predicted that the problems inherent in the burden-shifting
framework would be most acute in cases brought under the ADEA. Id. at 292.
105. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.4.
106. Id.
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that no heightened evidentiary requirement should be injected unless
Congress clearly mandates one." 7
The Dissenting Opinions
In a dissent, Justice Stevens contended that there was no reason to
interpret the because of language of § 623(a) any differently from the
way it was interpreted in pre-1991 Title VII cases such as Price
Waterhouse.'
Justice Stevens relied on the fact that the relevant
because of text in both statutes-the ADEA and pre-1991 Title VII-is
identical.'" "Mhe substantive provisions of the ADEA were derived
in haec verba from Title VII."" ° Therefore, as the plurality had
concluded in Price Waterhouse, the most natural reading of § 623(a)
prohibits adverse employment actions based wholly or even partly on the
age of an employee.' The fact that the Court here was construing the
did not, in Justice Stevens's mind, justify
ADEA rather than Title VII
112

B.

deviation from precedent.

Ironically, Justice Stevens also used the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
reinforce his interpretation of the phrase because of." Justice Stevens
reasoned that when Congress added the motivating factor language to
Title VII, Congress ratified the Price Waterhouse plurality's view
regarding the plaintiff's "motivating" standard of causation and rejected
the contention of the Price Waterhouse dissent." 4 Presumably Justice
Stevens reasoned that Congress agreed with Justice O'Connor's

107. Id. ("Congress has been unequivocal when imposing heightened proof requirements."). Justice Thomas concluded, as a corollary of the Court's "determinative factor"
holding, that ADEA defendants, unlike Title VII defendants, never bear the burden of
showing that they would have reached the same decision for lawful, nondiscriminatory
reasons alone. Id. at 2351.
108. Id. at 2352-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justice
Souter, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer. Id. at 2352.
109. See id. at 2353.
110. Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Trans World Arilines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). In response to this
contention, Justice Thomas noted that the Court has not always interpreted the ADEA in
light of Title VII. Id. at 2349 n.2 (majority opinon). For instance, the Court refused to
interpret the "because of... age" language of"§ 623(a) to bar discrimination against people
of all ages, even though the Court had previously [held that the] 'because of... race [or]
sex' in Title VII [prohibited] discrimination against ... all races and both sexes." Id.
(citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004)).
111. See id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. See id. at 2355-56.
114. Id. at 2355.
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statement, that because of meant but-for, determinative causation."15
Justice Stevens acknowledged that Congress had amended only Title
VII, and not the ADEA, with respect to mixed-motive claims, meaning
that the Court should decline to apply the mixed-motive provisions of the
6
F
(For example, the remedy
new Title VII amendments to the ADEA."
reduction consequences of a defendant's same-decision showing would
not apply in ADEA cases.).. However, Justice Stevens contended that
the interpretation of because of in Price Waterhouse should still govern
claims brought under the ADEA." Justice Stevens pointed to Smith
v. City of Jackson, Mississippi,"9 as an example of a pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII that had been held applicable to a claim brought
under the ADEA even though the corresponding provisions of Title
VII-but not those of the ADEA itself-were amended by the 1991
Act.120

Justice Stevens addressed the question proposed on certiorari by
adopting the Court's decision in Desert Palace.12 ' Like the majority,
Justice Stevens would not require a plaintiff to present direct evidence
of age discrimination; 22 unlike the majority, Justice Stevens would
allow a plaintiff who demonstrated through any evidence that age was
a motivating factor to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction.'"
Justice Breyer issued a separate dissent, agreeing with Justice
Stevens that mixed-motive instructions are appropriate under the
ADEA.' 24 Justice Breyer wrote separately to criticize the majority's
determination that the because of language in § 623(a) meant but-for
causation."2 Justice Breyer noted that in certain instances, but-for
causation may be appropriate. 2 6 For example, in tort cases objective
and scientific rules governing physical forces make but-for causation a
relatively easy standard to understand and apply.12 7 In contrast, age

115.
116.
117.
118.

See id.
See id. at 2356.
See id.
Id.

119. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
120. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relating to disparate impact
claims).
121. Id. at 2357.
122. Id. at 2358 (observing that a clear and unequivocal directive from Congress would
have been necessary to require direct evidence of age discrimination).
123. Id.
124. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Souter and
Justice Ginsburg. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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discrimination cases often focus on thought-related characterizations in
an effort to find an employer's motive."2 Justice Breyer contended
that in cases when an employer bases a decision on two factors-one
legitimate and one impermissible-the but-for causation standard
requires the court or jury to engage in a "hypothetical inquiry" about
what the decision would have been had the employer's thoughts and
surrounding circumstances been different."2 Because the employer
knows all of the reasons why an employment decision was made, and the
employees generally do not, the employer is in a stronger position to
Justice Breyer
answer the hypothetical inquiry for the court.' 8
suggested that to level the playing field, a plaintiff should be required
to show only that age played a role in the employer's decision or that the
employer took an adverse employment action "because of' age and other
reasons.' At this point the ADEA defendant would have the opportunity to avoid liability altogether by showing that it would have made the
adverse employment decision regardless of the impermissible factor.'32
Justice Breyer concluded that it is logical for this same-decision burden
to be an affirmative defense, rather than part of the liability phase,
because the employer is better situated from an evidentiary standpoint
to show how it would have acted in the hypothetical inquiry. 3'
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Perhaps the most significant implication of the holding in Gross is its
logical simplification of mixed-motive claims brought under the
ADEA.'" As Justice Thomas noted, courts often struggled with the
burden-shifting framework, especially when crafting jury instructions. 1'
By eliminating that framework' 3 6 for age discrimination
cases, the Supreme Court substantially simplified the analysis used
when fact finders in ADEA disparate treatment cases determine that an
employer's decision was based on both permissible and age-related
reasons.

128. Id
129. Id. at 2359.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
135. Id. at 2352; see, e4g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir.
1992) (mentioning the "murky water of shifting burdens in discrimination cases").
136. The burden shifting in this context only refers to the burden of persuasion.
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The analysis tracks the "determinative" language used in earlier
ADEA cases. Although the issue of whether the burden of persuasion
should shift in a mixed-motive situation was hotly contested, ADEA
precedent had consistently suggested, if not clearly held, that the
plaintiff must prove not only that age influenced the employer's decision
to some degree, but also that it was a "determinative" factor.' 37 If
determinativeis accorded its standard dictionary definition as connoting
conclusive or but-for causation,' and if a plaintiff is able to meet the
burden of showing that age was the determinative factor in the
employer's decision, then no ADEA defendant could logically demonstrate that its lawful motives alone would have generated the challenged
decision. After Gross ADEA defendants will introduce evidence of
legitimate motives simply to prevent plaintiffs from carrying their
burden of demonstrating that age was a determinative factor. If the
ADEA plaintiff does carry that heavy burden on causation, then no
affirmative defense will be available. This logical simplification of
mixed-motive claims should be especially helpful to lower courts trying
ADEA cases in which the plaintiff relies on highly indirect evidence,
because the courts will not need to administer the same-decision burden
shifting that had been superimposed on the primary burden-shifting
Corp. v. Green'l 9 and
framework developed by McDonnell Douglas
140
Inc.
Products,
Plumbing
Reeves v. Sanderson
Conversely, although the holding in Gross simplifies the analysis for
claims brought solely under the ADEA, it may complicate cases in which
a plaintiff asserts violations of both the ADEA and Title VII.'' In

137. See, e.g., Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2366 (2008); Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
610 (1993).
138. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (5th Cir. 1979) (interpreting determinative factor to mean but-for causation); Mulle v. McCauley, 927 A.2d 921, 929 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2007) (explaining the difference between important and determinative in an issue
unrelated to employment discrimination); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 616 (2002).

139. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
140. 530 U.S. 133 (2000); see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that because courts already have trouble applying
McDonnell and Burdine, adding the burden-shifting, mixed-motive analysis is not likely
to clarify what is required of courts in mixed-motive claims), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B) (2006)).
141. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Were the Court truly
worried about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries ... it would not reach today's
decision, which will further complicate every case in which a plaintiff raises both ADEA
and Title VII claims.").
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cases in which both age and an impermissible criterion under Title VII
are found to be motivating factors in an employer's decision, the burden
of proving how lawful factors affected the decision would shift to the
employer for the Title VII claim, but the burden would remain with the
plaintiff for the ADEA claim to show that the age factor was not merely
motivating but determinative.1, 2 In general, cases with both ADEA
and Title VII allegations will force judges to take pains to ensure that
the jury instructions enable the members of the jury to understand and
apply the evidence properly under each statute."
The Court's decision in Gross will also make it harder for ADEA
disparate treatment plaintiffs to survive motions for summary judgment
as well as motions for judgment as a matter of law. Before Gross an
ADEA plaintiff could avoid summary judgment if the judge concluded
that a reasonable person could find, by a preponderance of the potentially admissible evidence unearthed by discovery, that age was a factor to
some uncertain degree in the employer's decision.'" Now a plaintiff
must convince the court that a reasonable person could find by a
preponderance of the same evidence that age was the but-for or
determinative cause of the employer's decision." The same substantive burden must be overcome by a plaintiff facing a defendant's motion
for judgment as a matter of law.' This higher barrier at the summary judgment stage may curtail the growing number of ADEA actions
filed in recent years.'47

142. See id. at 2352 (majority opinion); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
100-01 (2003).
143. Of course, the Supreme Court has always stressed the importance of clearly
separating statutory causes of action. See, e.g., Hazen, 507 U.S. at 612 (distinguishing
causes of action by noting that an impermissible reason for termination such as race or
gender is not an impermissible reason under the ADEA).
144. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Port Royal, S.C., 586 F. Supp. 2d 498, 513 (D.S.C. 2008).
145. See, e.g., Fuller v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1248 (D. Colo. 2009)
(indicating that a plaintiff meets its burden of production on a motion for summary
judgment when a "reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs termination would not have
occurred but for Defendant's desire to discriminate"); Woehl v. Hy.Vee, Inc., 637 F. Supp.
2d 645, 656 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (noting that at the summary judgment stage, the issue is
"whether after viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is
a genuine issue of material fact that age was the but-for' cause of [the employer's] adverse
employment decision").
146. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (observing that the standard for summary judgment
is the same as the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
147. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Charges, httpJ/www.eeoc.gov//eeor/statistics/enforcementadea.cfm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010) (showing that the number of ADEA actions filed has increased sixtyone percent in the last ten years).
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The decision in Gross may also have a significant impact on discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981" or 42 U.S.C. §
1983."'g Most circuits have held that the burden-shifting framework
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins' 5 applies to both § 1981 and § 1983
claims.'
Courts have also held that the substantive elements of a
§ 1981 claim are identical to the elements of an employment discrimination claim brought under Title VII. 152

In a recent decision by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court held that
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse governed the mixedmotive analysis for claims brought under § 1981." In a footnote, the
court mentioned that it had asked what impact Gross might have on the
case, but both sides had agreed that Gross had no impact.15 Accordingly, the court declined to address the matter, but it observed in dictum
that § 1981 does not contain the because of language used in the ADEA
and relied upon by the majority in Gross." The court concluded that
the Price Waterhouse framework makes more sense than the one from
Grossin light of the broad range of contractual arrangements covered by
§ 19 8 1 .16 Concurring in the judgment, Circuit Judge Jordan wrote
separately to express his concern that the Supreme Court's decision in
Gross may very well have an impact on employment discrimination
claims brought under § 1981."' While Judge Jordan admitted he was

148.
149.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).

150. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
151. Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 (3rd Cir. 2009); Ballard v. Muskogee Reg'
Med. Ctr., 238 F.3d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001); Mabra v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Local Union No. 1996, 176 F.3d 1357, 1357 (11th Cir. 1999); Gray v. Bd. of Higher
Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 905 (2d Cir. 1982); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 967 & n.5
(8th Cir. 1981); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980);
Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir. 1976). Although most circuits
have held that the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework analysis applies to claims
brought under § 1981 and § 1983, the Ninth Circuit stands alone in holding that the 1991
amendments apply to § 1981. Hardy v. Town of Greenwich, 629 F. Supp. 2d 192, 199 (D.
Conn. 2009); see Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 932-34 (9th Cir. 2007).
152. See, e.g., Schurr v. Resorts Intl Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 499 (3d Cir. 1999).
153. See Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009). The court noted
that although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended § 1981 in other ways, it did not make
the mixed-motive amendments applicable to § 1981 claims. Id. The court concluded that
the decision in Price Waterhouse, not the 1991 Act, controlled the case. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. ("If race plays any role in a challenged decision by a defendant, the plain terms
of the statutory text suggest the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case ... because the
plaintiff has not enjoyed 'the same right' as other similarly situated persons.").
157. Id. at 185 (Jordan, J., concurring).
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not certain on the matter,'" he noted that it was ironic that the Third
Circuit majority recognized the textual distinction between the ADEA
and § 1981 while at the same time ignoring the textual distinctions
between Title VII and § 1981.1"9 Judge Jordan cautioned that the
majority should heed the Supreme Court's admonition in Gross to not
simply transpose analytical constructions "from one statute to another
without a thorough and thoughtful analysis.""6 Judge Jordan concludin Gross, a
ed that given the broad language of the Supreme Court 16
careful examination of Third Circuit precedent was needed. 1
In any event, the holding in Gross may be short-lived. Members of
Congress in both the Senate and the House have introduced bills to
supersede the ruling in Gross in favor of a more employee-friendly cause
of action under the ADEA. 5 2 If successful, the additions to the ADEA
will mirror those added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
essentially creating the same burden-shifting framework that currently
exists for mixed-motive cases brought under Title VII. 1"
ROBERT FULLER

158. Id.
159. Id. at 186.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 187. A case decided recently by the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut also addressed the issue briefly. Noting that although it was bound
by Second Circuit precedent that applied Price Waterhouse to § 1981 claims, the district
court in Hardy v. Town of Greenwich, 629 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Conn. 2009), predicted that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may revisit the issue. Id. at 200.
The district court stated that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gross may not extend to
§ 1981 claims, pointing to the because of language in the ADEA that was absent from
§ 1981. Id
162. S. 1756, 111th Cong., § 2 (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., § 2 (2009).
163. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2XB), with S. 1756, § 3, and H.R. 3721, § 3.

